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INTRODUCTION

With the War on Terrorism now proceeding at full force, it is
often difficult to fathom the lethargic development of America's antiterrorism policy over the past thirty years.1 In a few instances, the
United States has responded to terrorism with direct engagementmilitary strikes,2 economic sanctions,3 and diplomatic isolation.4 In
* Copyright © 2008 by John D. Shipman.
1. See generally Laura K. Donohue, In the Name of National Security: U.S.
CounterterroristMeasures, 1960-2000, 13 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 15 (addressing
differing U.S. responses to acts of international terrorism during the preceding four
decades).
2. For example, on August 7, 1998, two bombs were simultaneously detonated
outside two American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing twelve Americans and
more than two hundred African nationals. See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d
225, 227-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (addressing the numerous offenses which arose from
defendant Osama bin Laden's involvement in the international bombing of the U.S.
embassies).
The United States government quickly traced these attacks to a
fundamentalist Islamic terror network financed by bin Laden. See David Johnston, U.S.
Says Suspect Does Not Admit Role in Bombings or Ties to Saudi, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1998, at A7; Benjamin Weiser, Bombing Defendant Said To Claim Coercion, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1998, at A4. In response, the Clinton Administration unilaterally ordered a
military strike against suspected terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan and a target in
the Sudan thought to be manufacturing weapons for terrorist entities. The military strikes
were aimed at both defusing terrorist threats to American interests and deterring
additional attacks. See Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites
in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460, 1460-62 (Aug. 20, 1998) (justifying
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most cases, however, the United States government's responses to
terrorism prior to the September 11th attacks had been more
insidious and included heightened security measures and more
stringent immigration restrictions.5 The violence and audacity of
recent terrorist activities, however, revealed the outlines of a new
world, spawning a long overdue war against terrorism as democracies
finally began to fully appreciate the grave threat of international

terrorism in the twenty-first century.6 But the terrorist attacks that
took place on September 11th were novel only in their magnitude and
truculence,7 and they represented a "shocking culmination" of
decades of deadly assaults against American interests both at home
and abroad.8

Prior to September 11th, increases in international terrorism had
been marked by only a faint response from Western democracies, as
terrorism quietly "fell into a general background noise of global

American military action as a response to a perceived threat to American interests
abroad); Steven Erlanger, Missile Strikes Are Seen as New Strategy for U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1998, § 1, at 10 (framing the American military strikes as a deterrent measure, as
opposed to an isolated response pertaining to a particular act of terror).
3. Prior to the embassy bombings in Africa, economic disincentives appeared to be
the preferred response to acts of international terrorism. On December 21, 1988, Pan Am
Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people on board, including
188 American citizens. See Michael Wines, Libya Now Linked to Pan Am Blast, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at Al. Investigators ultimately assigned responsibility to Libyan
intelligence officers acting under a directive from their nation's rogue dictatorial regime.
See Steven Erlanger, 4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A7; Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Accuses Libya as 2 Are Charged in
Pan Am Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al. The first Bush Administration
successfully lobbied the international community for economic sanctions that isolated
Libya and placed the nation in economic turmoil. See Paul Lewis, Sanctions on Libya
Begin To Take Hold as Deadline Passes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at Al; Paul Lewis,
U.S. and Allies To Resume Effort To Get Sanctions Against Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1992, at Al; Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Asks Security Council To Put Sanctions on Libya,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at 6.
4. Allison Taylor, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with Recent
Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 533, 533 (2003); see
also Flynt Leverett, Illusion and Reality, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2006, at 29, 30 (discussing
in significant detail the diplomatic "sticks-and-carrots" approach to terrorist engagement
that characterized American foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Cold
War).
5. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 533.
6. See John Norton Moore, Introduction to CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST
TERRORISM 3, 3-4 (John Norton Moore ed. 2004).
7. See id. at 4.
8. Id. For a brief compendium of major terrorist attacks against American interests
over the past several decades, see Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The
Case for Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 561-62
(2002).
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violence." 9 Even bin Laden's cryptic "declaration of war"' 10 against

the United States had fallen by the wayside as the ominous threat of
militant Islamic fundamentalism went largely unnoticed by Western
governments." Today, America has come to realize that ultimate
victory in the War on Terrorism will hinge on our nation's ability to

utilize the entire spectrum of available means to bring terrorists to
justice, while striving to maintain our commitment to the rule of law. 2
Traditionally,

the

executive

branch

has

shouldered

the

responsibility of directing U.S. anti-terrorism efforts as part of the
President's broad purview in the areas of foreign policy and
international relations. 3 Over the past decade, however, the judicial
9. See Moore, supra note 6, at 4.
10. On February 23, 1998, a London-based Arabic newspaper published a formal
declaration written by Osama bin Laden and the leaders of several militant Islamic groups.
The document criticized America's role in the Gulf War and its continued presence in the
Middle East, and it accused America of "occupying the lands of Islam ...and using its
bases in the [Arabian] peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic
peoples." Frank A. Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in
the Emerging War on Terrorism, 34 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 1, 12 (2002). It declared that
all Muslims had a duty "to fight the invaders of Muslim lands" and concluded "with a
fatwa [a religious edict] imploring Muslims to engage in jihad" against the United States
and its interests abroad. Id. at 12-13; see also Bernard Lewis, License To Kill: Usama bin
Laden's Declaration of Jihad, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 14, 14-15 (discussing
Osama bin Laden's formal declaration of war against the United States).
11. Moore, supranote 6, at 4.
12. See William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with ...Mire? Civil Remedies and the New
War on State Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 105, 105 (2002)
(discussing President Bush's declaration that America would "not only deal with those
who dare attack America," but also "those who harbor them and feed them and house
them"); see also NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT
OF INT'L TERRORISM 26 (2000) (Y 3.2:T 27/2000018493), available at http://purl.access.gpo
.gov/GPO/LPS4710 ("The United States should use all the tools at its disposal to stop or
disrupt non-state sources of support for international terrorism.").
13. See Taylor, supranote 4, at 533. As one commentator has noted,
In general, the U.S. courts defer to executive foreign policy decisions. The
Constitution delegates much of the power to conduct U.S. foreign policy to the
executive branch .... In the field of foreign relations, any compromise of secrecy
and decisiveness weakens the executive branch's power to negotiate with other
nations and use military force.
Michael J. Weiner, The Importance of a Clear Rule for Judicial Deference to Executive
Interpretationsof Treaties: A Defense of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 125, 132 (1993); see also An Assessment of the Tools Needed To Fight the Financingof
Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 71-77 (2002)
[hereinafter An Assessment of the Tools], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony
.cfm?id=519&wit id=1421 (statement of Allan Gerson, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign
Relations); Sean K. Mangan, Compensation for "Certain" Victims of Terrorism Under
Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Individual
Payment at an InstitutionalCost, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1037, 1067-68 (2002).
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branch has also entered the foreign affairs arena, opening the door to
permit private citizens to file civil suits "aimed at crippling terrorist
organizations at their foundation-their assets, funding, and financial
backing."' 4 During this time, America "has become a world leader in
providing a judicial forum for private rights of action against foreign
terror groups and the regimes that support them."' 5 In Halberstam v.
Welch, 6 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit opined that civil

terrorism lawsuits serve an invaluable role in supplementing the
traditional criminal law process and helping to facilitate government

efforts to bankrupt foreign terrorist organizations. 7
Despite earlier calls for a moratorium on civil suits arising from
the September 11th attacks, there has nevertheless been a marked

increase in terrorism-related litigation over the past five years."
Unlike prior civil suits that generally focused on the terrorists and the
sovereign states that directly committed acts of terror, the cases filed
in the wake of September 11th have embarked on a new campaign to
expand liability beyond the terrorists themselves in order to reach the

organizations that support terrorism while hiding beneath a fagade of
legitimacy.'
Although lawsuits against private sponsors of international
terrorism appear to be a straightforward pursuit of justice, these cases
have quickly evolved into a Byzantine game of complicated legal and
political maneuvering-not only among some of the nation's

preeminent law firms,2" but also between Congress, the judiciary, and
14. Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the
International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and
Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679, 682 (2005).
15. Hamish Hume & Gordon Dwyer Todd, Ambulance Chasing For Justice: How
Private Lawsuits for Civil Damages Can Help Combat International Terrorism (Dec. 1,
2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/publD.118/pub-detail.asp.
16. 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
17. Id. at 489.
18. Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the Association of American Justice
(formerly the Association of Trial Lawyers of America) called for a moratorium on all
civil suits arising from acts of terrorism-the first time the organization had ever called for
a moratorium of its kind. See Richard Milin, Suing Terroristsand Their Private and State
Supporters,N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 2001, at S1.
19. See, e.g., Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (Burnett I1), 292 F. Supp. 2d 9,
10-11 (D.D.C. 2003) (alleging a cause of action against various financial institutions for
their complicity in acts of international terrorism).
20. Even prior to the commencement of formal litigation, the Prince Sultan of Saudi
Arabia retained Bill Jeffress of Baker Botts, the Arab Bank sought representation at King
& Spalding, the Saudi Binladin Group retained Jones Day, and the AI-Rajhi Banking
Group negotiated for representation with the law firm of White & Case. Additional law
firms representing defendants in recent terrorism-related litigation include Kellog Huber,
Akin Gump, and Fulbright & Jaworski. A number of plaintiffs have retained the services
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the executive branch.2' First impressions suggest that civil terrorism
lawsuits provide a valuable supplement to America's anti-terrorism
strategy. With private lawsuits, however, the fight against terrorism is
removed from the political forum and transferred to a world of
private international law where the interests of individual plaintiffs
may run afoul of the larger, more abstract interests of our national
government.2 2 In addition to dealing with a host of novel legal issues
brought about by civil terrorism litigation, American courts have
become the newest battleground in a struggle between the executive
branch and Congress. In one respect, the executive branch is seeking
to defend its traditional foreign policy powers. In other respects,
however, Congress has become increasingly vigilant in its efforts to
punish rogue governments, as well as private sponsors of terrorism, in
order to allow its constituents a means of financial redress against acts
23
of international terrorism.
This Comment represents only a modest attempt to parse some
of the complex legal and political issues arising from lawsuits aimed at
private sponsors of terrorism. Indeed, the legal barriers encountered
by private litigants in holding terrorists and their supporters civilly
accountable for their atrocities are significant. Increasingly, however,
plaintiffs have experienced more success in the courtroom, 24 aided by
a new battery of federal statutes and a judiciary eager to join the fight
against international terror. And despite the political and diplomatic
encumbrances inherent when private litigants utilize the judicial
branch to target rogue terrorist actors, the use of terrorism lawsuits
represents the way of the new world, where democracies must utilize
every means at their disposal to fight terrorist actors. Despite recent
advancements, however, courts in the United States remain illequipped at bringing terrorists to justice on an international scale.
of international law expert Allan Gerson and famed plaintiffs attorney Ron Motley of
Motley Rice, LLC. Interview with Ron Motley, Managing Partner, Motley Rice, LLC, in
Mt. Pleasant, S.C. (Dec. 16, 2006 and Dec. 22, 2006).
21. See infra Part II.
22. Strauss, supra note 14, at 682.
23. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 112.
24. See infra notes 88-110 and accompanying text (addressing with greater specificity
the issues presented in a number of contemporary cases involving terrorism litigation).
25. Despite the benefits of using civil law to combat terrorism, the limits of our civil
justice system-such as the establishment of personal jurisdiction-also place significant
restraints on the effectiveness of this tactic. Terrorist adversaries are composed of
transient and private networks, and bringing these sometimes invisible enemies to justice
has proven elusive even in those cases where plaintiffs have most clearly suffered at the
hands of the defendant. See Ruth Wedgwood, Civil Remedies and Terrorism, in CIVIL
LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 6, at 159-60; see also infra Part I.B
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The first Part of this Comment surveys the recent legal
development of terrorism lawsuits and examines the various causes of
action that Congress has created in order to provide civilian-plaintiffs
with a means of redressing acts of international terrorism.
Additionally, this Part details the unique issues arising with respect to
service of process, federal jurisdiction, venue, pre-trial discovery, and
the execution of judgments against terrorist defendants. Part II
addresses the distinct and complex policy implications that arise when
using U.S. civil courts to adjudicate matters traditionally falling within
the foreign policy purview of the executive branch. The second Part
also outlines the crucial role that private terrorism litigation maintains
in America's continuing War on Terrorism.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL
TERRORISM LITIGATION

The September 11th attacks have revitalized the concept of
terrorism lawsuits,2 6 even though such lawsuits existed long before alQaeda became part of our popular nomenclature. Unlike early
terrorism lawsuits that generally targeted private terrorist operations
and their financial supporters, contemporary terrorism litigation has
pursued the foreign governments having facilitated and financed acts
of terrorism directed at U.S. nationals traveling abroad.27
Between 1975 and 1989, Lebanon was in a constant state of
violence as political strife escalated into terrorism-some of which
was directed at U.S. citizens residing in the Middle East.28 Around
that same time, a newly formed Iranian government rose to power,
led by the hard-line Islamic cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini; the new
(discussing the difficulties of service of process with respect to terrorist defendants); Part
I.C (discussing the difficulties in obtaining personal and subject matter jurisdiction over
these defendants).
26. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 (In re TerroristAttacks 1), 349 F.

Supp. 2d 765, 779-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleging a cause of action against financial
institutions and government officials responsible for providing support to the terrorist
activities of al-Qaeda).
27. See, e.g., Eisenfield v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2000)

(seeking from Iran damages arising from an Iran-sponsored terrorist bombing); Anderson
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 (D.D.C. 2000) (seeking damages from

the Islamic Republic of Iran for a kidnapping committed by a government-encouraged
terrorist organization).
28. See generally Christopher J. Le Mon, UnilateralIntervention by Invitation in Civil
Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741, 755-62 (2003)
(addressing the political and social tensions in Lebanon in 1958); Joshua Slomich, The
Ta'if Accord: Legalizing the Syrian Occupation of Lebanon, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.

REV. 619 (1999) (discussing the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and subsequent political
violence spawned by anti-Western fervor).
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regime's anti-Western fervor led to a myriad of state-sponsored
terrorist activities directed at U.S. interests in the Middle East.29
Although the victims of these attacks sometimes turned to America's
civil justice system to seek financial restitution from the Iranian

government,3 0 U.S. courts routinely dismissed cases against foreign

states, citing the broad immunity extended to foreign nations by the
1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA").3 t

In 1988, the detonation of a sophisticated Semtex plastic
explosive led to the fatal crash of Pan Am Flight 103 over the small
town of Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all of the 259 passengers and
crew members aboard and eleven people on the ground.32 Although
the attack on Flight 103 was eventually traced to a group of Libyan
intelligence agents working under the directive of Colonel Muammar

Quaddafi,3 3 "the families of the victims... were unable to successfully
sue Libya for its involvement because international terrorist activities
did not fall into one of the exceptions under the FSIA."34 Frustrated
by their inability to establish civil liability for acts of international
terrorism, the families of the victims of Flight 103 lobbied Congress

29. See Winston Nagan & Craig Hammer, Patriotism, Nationalism, and the War on
Terror: A Mild Plea in Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REV. 933, 967-73 (2004) (chronicling the fall
of the pro-Western Shah and the Ayatollah's subsequent rise to power, which
"contaminated America's relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran").
30. See, e.g., Anderson, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 107, 109 (filing for damages against the
government of Iran for a 1985 kidnapping where Iranian agents held American Terry
Anderson hostage in a Lebanese dungeon for over seven years).
31. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West 2006) ("Subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 1976] a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and
of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."); see Hoye, supra
note 12, at 109 (noting that "foreign governments and their agents have enjoyed broad
common law and statutory immunity from criminal prosecution and civil lawsuits under
international law, even for international terrorist acts in which they have played key
roles"). Congress had originally enacted the FSIA in an effort to codify the longestablished principle of restrictive sovereign immunity, which forbids American courts
from exercising jurisdiction over foreign governments except in certain enumerated
circumstances. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605. The key exceptions to immunity under the FSIA include cases that involve
commercial activity, non-commercial torts such as car accidents, and cases where there
have been explicit or implied waivers of immunity. Taylor, supra note 4, at 535; see 28
U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(1), (2) (West 2006); Keith Sealing, "State Sponsors of Terrorism" Is a
Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now
Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 119, 122 (2003).
32. See Michael P. Scharf & Amy M. Miller, Foreword: Terrorism on Trial, 36 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 287 (2004); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. Scharf & Miller, supra note 32, at 287-90.
34. Taylor, supra note 4, at 536 (citing Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 101 F. 3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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intensely to pass legislation that would facilitate civil lawsuits against
sovereign states for acts of state-sponsored terrorism.35
Finally, in 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),3 6 which amended the FSIA
to allow American citizens to sue certain foreign countries37 for acts
of terrorism." Armed with Congressional authorization, victims of
international terrorist attacks quickly filed a litany of cases against the
governments of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, alleging violations arising
from a wide range of state-sponsored terror.3 9 These lawsuits appear
to have reached their zenith with the seminal case of Flatow v. Islamic
35. Terrorism: Victims' Access to TerroristAssets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 44-45 (1999) (statement of Allan Gerson, Senior Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations).
36. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 221, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7) (West 2006
& Supp. 2007)).
37. The AEDPA only allows for suits against foreign states that have been designated
as a "state sponsor of terrorism" by the U.S. Department of State. § 1605(a)(7)(A);
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589(a), 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-172 (1997) (codified at § 1605) ("[Ain official, employee, or agent of a foreign
state designated [as a state sponsor of terrorism] ... while acting within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the
national's legal representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official,
employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction ...
for money damages.
). Until recently, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba,
and Sudan were officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism. 31 C.F.R. § 596.201
(2007) (listing those nations designated as state sponsors of terrorism and prohibiting U.S.
nationals from engaging "in a financial transaction with the government of [such]
countr[ies]"). In light of recent events, however, both Iraq and Libya have been removed
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State,
Rescission of Libya's Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (May 15, 2006),
http://state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/66244.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Iraq
Removed from the
State Sponsors of Terrorism List (Oct.
20, 2004),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/rmo/hglt/37603.htm.
38. One commentator had the following to say about this amendment:
The terrorist exception sets out certain conditions that must be met in order for a
U.S. citizen to bring suit against a foreign state for an act of terrorism. First, the
case must be one in which... "personal injury or death ... was caused by an act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support .. . for such an act." Second, the ... victim must be a U.S.
national ....
Finally, if the act of terrorism occurred in the defendant state's
territory, a plaintiff must first attempt arbitration in accordance with international
rules.
Taylor, supra note 4, at 536 (footnotes omitted) (quoting AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) (codified at § 1605(a)(7))).
39. See, e.g., Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2001); Rein v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.
Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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Republic of Iran,4" which arose from the tragic death of twenty-two
year old American Alisa Flatow who was studying abroad in Israel

when a suicide bomber drove an explosive-laden van into a bus in the
Gaza Strip.4 ' The Shaqaqi faction of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad-a

well-known Middle Eastern terror outfit-later claimed responsibility
for the attack.4 2 Three years after Alisa Flatow's death, a federal

district court in Washington, D.C., determined that the Iranian
government was civilly liable for devising and financing the terrorist
activities conducted by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Israelicontrolled territories.43 The court ultimately awarded the Flatow

family $27 million in compensatory damages and $225 million in
punitive damages."
The Flatow case, like the vast majority of early terrorism
lawsuits, resulted in a default judgment.45 Additionally, the issues
presented in Flatow were raised sua sponte by the court,46 as was the
case with many of its predecessors.47 As a result of these default

judgments, many aspects of the AEDPA remain untested almost a
decade after it was enacted." Further, the Flatow family and many
other victims who received favorable verdicts against foreign

governments found it impossible to execute their judgments and were
left only with the cold comfort of hollow victories against seemingly
untouchable sovereign aggressors.49
The difficulty that plaintiffs have faced in collecting judgments
from sovereign defendants has been the death knell for the vast

40. 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 8-9, 34.
44. See id. at 6-8. Although Judge Lamberth freely awarded punitive damages in the
Flatow case, Congress has since repealed legislation that would have permitted punitive
damages against foreign states in claims brought under the AEDPA. See Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(f)(2), 114
Stat. 1543. Since then, Judge Lamberth and other federal district court judges have ruled
that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a foreign state. E.g., Weinstein v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n.1 (D.D.C. 2002); Elahi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 113 n.17 (D.D.C. 2000).
45. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6; see Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 691, 699-701 (2005) (discussing the multitude of
default judgments that have been entered in civil terrorism lawsuits). Under the FSIA, a
court may not enter a default judgment "unless the claimant establishes his claim or right
to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2000).
46. Flatow,999 F. Supp. at 6.
47. Strauss, supra note 14, at 695.
48. Id.
49. See infra Part I.F.
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majority of lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. 0 Professor
John Moore, one of the original drafters of the FSIA, believes that

both courts as well as the State Department do everything they can to
preclude lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism.5 Because of
this archaic thought process by judges and State Department
officials,52 plaintiffs' attorneys now focus the lion's share of their

resources on private terrorist organizations and the institutions that
lend them support, rather than pursuing sovereign governments. 3 By

attempting to hold private terrorist supporters legally accountable for
their actions, contemporary terrorism lawsuits are designed not only
to compensate those who have suffered, but also to financially

bankrupt terrorist organizations.54 Looking toward the future, "it
becomes clear that the United States courts will have to increasingly
grapple with the circumstances in which complicity in terrorism
engenders civil liability." 5
A.

Statutory Causes of Action Against Sponsors of Terrorism
Three federal statutes currently provide plaintiffs with the ability

to bring civil suits against private terrorists and their supporters. The
most significant of these statutes is the 1992 Anti-Terrorism Act
("ATA"),56 which "provides the most direct path for citizens to sue
non-state terrorists for damages ... by explicitly conferring new
extraterritorial jurisdiction upon the federal courts."5 7 In order to
supplement the cause of action granted by the ATA, plaintiffs have
also utilized the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")5 8 and the civil

50. Telephone Interview with John Moore, Dir., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Law, Univ. of Va.
(Dec. 19, 2006).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Burnett I, 292 F. Supp. 2d 9, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2003); Smith ex rel Smith v.
Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
54. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint at 199-205, Burnett H, 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (No.
1:02-cv-01616-JR) (asserting the rights of terrorism victims to sue those responsible and
arguing that they could aid the government in the war against terrorism by helping to
bankrupt the terrorist organizations and choke off the support required to maintain a
viable global terror network).
55. Allan Gerson, Terrorism and Genocide: Determining Accountability and Liability,
28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 79,86 (2005).

56. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000) (initially adopted in 1990 but later repealed as a result of a
technical enrolling error and reenacted in 1992).
57. Seth Stratton, Taking Terrorists to Court: A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits
Against TerroristsUnder the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27,
31-32 (2004).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
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provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO").5 9

The ATA permits "any national of the United States... [injured
by] an act of international terrorism... [to] sue ...in any appropriate

district court of the United States."' 6 The legislative history of the
ATA reveals a distinct Congressional intent to deter and punish acts

of international terrorism6' by "remov[ing] the jurisdictional hurdles
...and ...empower[ing] victims with all the weapons available in
civil litigation."62 To this end, Congress used the ATA as a means to

enhance the power of private citizens to aid in the War on
Terrorism.6 3 And although the language of the statute occupies just a

few small paragraphs in the United States Code, it has now been
broadly accepted that the ATA casts a wide net in terms of terrorist
accountability, 64 allowing plaintiffs to pursue not only the terrorists
themselves, but also their leadership and financial resources.65

Although the ATA extended victims of international terrorism
an enormously broad spectrum of rights, it remained "virtually
untested" for nearly a decade. 6' In 2001, however, the parents of
seventeen-year-old David Boim filed suit67 under the ATA in the
Northern District of Illinois after their son was gunned down by a

group of Hamas68 militants outside a bus station in the Israeli West
Bank.69

Palestinian authorities later apprehended David Boim's

59. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000); see infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000).
61. E.g., Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232,
239 (D.R.I. 2004).
62. 137 CONG. REC. 8143, 8143 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
63. See Jennifer Rosenfield, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing International
Terroriststo Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 726, 737 (1992).
64. See 138 CONG. REC. 33627, 33628-29 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(outlining the intended breadth of the ATA and its application to terrorist activities).
65. Id.
66. Stratton, supra note 57, at 32; see also Milin, supra note 18, at 53 (explaining that,
prior to the decision in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute & Holy Land Foundation, the
ATA went virtually unnoticed).
67. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir.
2002).
68. Hamas is a well-known terror organization that "seeks to establish a
fundamentalist Palestinian state," id. at 1002, while driving Christians and Jews out of vast
regions of Asia and Africa. "Hamas seeks to advance its political objectives through acts
of terrorism .....
Id. Members of Hamas operating in the Middle East receive
instructions, financial support, and weapons from other Hamas organizers located
throughout the world. See id.
69. Id. at 1001-03.
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attackers-both of whom were known members of the military wing
of Hamas-in connection with the slaying.7"

The Boim family, intent on forging a new path of terrorist
liability,7' filed suit not only against the terrorists themselves, but also
against the "ostensibly philanthropic groups ... which they claimed

were American front organizations for Hamas. '7 2 According to the
Boim family and their team of legal experts, the seemingly

humanitarian functions of these purportedly charitable organizations
simply masked their true mission of raising and funneling money to
Hamas operatives in order to carry out terrorist activities abroad.73
Although the ATA is silent on the issue of "aiding and abetting"

terrorism, Congress intended for this statute to impose liability "at
any point along the causal chain of terrorism."7 4 The Boim case
became the first to articulate a theory of terrorist liability based solely
upon the defendants' knowledge that their funds were being used to
conduct acts of international terrorism.7 5

70. Id. at 1002.
71. See id. at 1001 (stating that the case was one of first impression and suggesting that
this theory of terrorist liability had been previously unexplored).
72. Milin, supra note 18, at 53.
73. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1005. Specifically, the Boim plaintiffs contended that Hamas
control centers raised funds from sympathetic parties in the United States and then
laundered the money to operatives in the Middle East. These Middle East operatives
would then use the funds to train terrorists and pay for weapons used in terror attacks. Id.
The role of Islamic charities in funneling more money to terrorist operatives has recently
moved to the forefront with the Justice Department's high profile indictment of the Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development, who government prosecutors contend
operated as a chief financer of terrorism directed at American civilians. See Associated
Press, Muslim Charity Indicted on Terrorism Charges, Fox NEWS, July 27, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,127164,00.html
(discussing the forty-two-count
indictment returned by the federal grand jury against the charity and seven of its officers);
Leslie Eaton, ProsecutorsSay a Charity Aided Terrorists Indirectly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2007, at A23 (outlining the government's theory as it progressed during the course of the
Holy Land trial); Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Charity Sues Treasury Dept. and Seeks
Dismissal of Charges of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A24 (summarizing the
charges and the legal theories upon which the government's case was premised).
However, the government's highly publicized case against the charity recently ended in a
mistrial after nineteen days of deliberations. See Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecutionof Muslim
Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at Al.
74. See S. REP. No. 102-342, at 22 (1992) (Y 1.1/5:102-342); see also 136 CONG. REC.
7592, 7592 (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("With the enactment of this legislation, we set an
example to the world of how the United States legal system deals with terrorists. If
terrorists have assets within our jurisdictional reach, American citizens will have the
power to seize them.").
75. Rudolph Lehrer, Unbalancing the Terrorists' Checkbook: Analysis of U.S. Policy
in Its Economic War on InternationalTerrorism, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 358
(2002).
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After the Boim lawsuit was filed, each of the six defendants filed
motions to dismiss, claiming that the ATA did " 'not render them...
liable for the murder of an American citizen ...by international
terrorists unless they ... participated directly' " in the act of

terrorism. 76 The district court rejected these arguments but
subsequently granted the defendants leave to file an interlocutory
appeal to the Seventh Circuit."

Less than a week after the terrorist

attacks of September 11th, the Seventh Circuit convened to address
the fundamental question of whether funding a terrorist organization
was sufficient in itself to establish civil liability under the ATA.78
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit began with the basic
proposition that the ATA represents a codification of "general
common law tort principles ...[intended] to extend civil liability for

acts of international terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort
law. ' 79 Justifying its significant expansion of an otherwise vague
statute, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the ATA "should be
interpreted in light of Congress's subsequent enactment of [18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A,8 ° a criminal statute that] outlaws the provision of material

support to any international terrorist group
court concluded that Congress must have
portion of the ATA encompass the "generic
foreign terrorist organizations] outlawed

or terrorist act."81 The
intended that the civil
provision of support [to
in section 2339A and

76. Peter M. Mansfield, Terrorism and a Civil Cause of Action: Boim, Ungar, and
Joint Torts, CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L., Spring 2003, http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/
articles/spring2003/Spring2003.htm (quoting Boim, 291 F.3d at 1010).
77. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1007; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) ("When a district judge, in
making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of
the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in
writing in such order.").
78. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1007.
79. Id. at 1010; see also 137 CONG. REC. 8143, 8143 (1991) (statement of Sen.
Grassley) ("The ATA accords victims of terrorism the remedies of American tort law,
including treble damages and attorney's fees."); Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S.
2465 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 136 (1990) (statement of Joseph A. Morris, President, General
Counsel, Lincoln Legal Foundation) ("[T]he bill as drafted is powerfully broad, and its
intention ... is to ... bring [in] all of the substantive law of the American tort law

system.").
80. "Whoever provides material support or resources ...knowing or intending that
they are to be used in preparation for, or carrying out, a [terrorist act] ...shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any
person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2339A(a) (West Supp. 2007).
81. Hume & Todd, supra note 15.
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2339B."' Therefore, the court determined that knowingly providing
financial support to terrorist organizations is tantamount to
committing an act of international terrorism, and that defendants can
be civilly culpable under the ATA.83
Cautious to limit its decision, however, the court also recognized
that "funding simpliciter" was insufficient to give rise to liability; thus,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant had some "knowledge
of and intent to further the payee's violent criminal acts."' Perhaps
equally significant was the fact that the Seventh Circuit rejected a key
provision in the Restatement of Torts, which would have allowed a
defense to charitable groups that made only modest contributions to
terrorist entities." The practical effect of the Boim decision was to
open American courtrooms to an entirely new class of litigants by
explicitly recognizing a cause of action under the ATA for "aiding
and abetting" terrorism, even in cases where the defendant had no
specific knowledge of the actual terrorist activity.86 Had the court
accepted the provisions in the Restatement, it would have allowed
terrorist organizations to "avoid liability [on behalf of those who
support them] by simply pooling together small donations."87
By the time of the September 11th attacks, it appeared that
courts-at least the Seventh Circuit-were prepared to utilize the
ATA to facilitate the economic war against those who provided
financial assistance to terrorist entities.88 Despite plaintiffs' recent
successes under the ATA,89 however, it was far from "self-evident
that the events of September 11 [fell] within the statute's definition of
'international terrorism.' "90
In contradistinction to "domestic
terrorism," the ATA stipulates that an act of " 'international
terrorism' . . . [must] occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries."'"
Such an act may transcend national boundaries "in terms of the
82. Id.
83. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1011.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1977) ("[Plarticipation
by the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other.").
86. See Recent Case, 116 HARv. L. REV. 713, 716 (2002).
87. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015; Recent Case, supra note 86, at 717 (citing Boim,291 F.3d
at 1015).
88. See generally Lehrer, supra note 75 (discussing Boim and its corresponding effect
on the ability to hold terrorist financers responsible for their misdeeds).
89. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
90. Smith ex rel Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
91. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1)(C) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
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means by which [the act was] accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum."'
Courts first approached the application of the ATA to the
September 11th attacks in Smith ex rel Smith v. Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan.9 3 In granting the plaintiff's motion for default judgment
against the defendants, the court in Smith ex rel Smith determined
that, although "the acts of September 11 clearly 'occurred primarily'
in the United States," they were nevertheless acts of international
terrorism in that they "transcend[ed] national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they [were] accomplished ...or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate."94 As a result, the plaintiffs had

stated a viable cause of action under the ATA.95
Following the court's decision in Smith ex rel Smith, victims of
the September 11th attacks filed numerous lawsuits against a host of
alleged terrorist culprits, and virtually all of the plaintiffs have

pleaded a cause of action under the ATA.9 6

Two of the most

significant cases-both legally and politically-are Burnett v. Al
Baraka Investment & Development Corp.97 and Ashton v. al-Qaeda
Islamic Army.98 As an illustration, the Burnett plaintiffs are seeking
over $100 trillion in actual and punitive damages99 from an array of

92. Id.
93. 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
94. Id. at 221 (citing § 2331(1)(C)).
95. Id. at 222.
96. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint, supra note 54, at 199 (bringing suit against
over twenty defendants whom plaintiffs alleged "promoted, financed, sponsored, or
otherwise materially supported" the events of September 11th).
97. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (Burnett I), 274 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C.
2003); Burnett II, 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003).
98. Ashton v. al Qaeda Islamic Army, C.A. No. 1:02-6977 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Along
with four other lawsuits pending in the District of Columbia and the Southern District of
New York, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the Burnett and
Ashton cases into a single action to be heard in the Southern District of New York. See In
re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2003). The
Southern District of New York issued an opinion in this consolidated action in early 2005,
which this Comment will refer to as In re Terrorist Attacks I. See In re Terrorist Attacks I,
349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Later that year, the district court issued another
opinion with respect to other motions in the same matter, which this Comment will refer
to as In re Terrorist Attacks I. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (In re
Terrorist Attacks 11), 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y 2005). In the interest of practicality,
this Comment will sometimes refer to In re TerroristAttacks 1,In re Terrorist Attacks II,
and other cases arising from the attacks of September 11, 2001, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 384 F. Supp. 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), collectively, as the September 11th Cases.
99. See Strauss, supranote 14, at 718.
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defendants alleged to have facilitated the September 11th attacks."°
Although the Burnett and Ashton lawsuits differ slightly in their
scope, each of the cases are highly complex class action suits with
several thousand plaintiffs asserting causes of action against
individual terrorists, Islamic charitable organizations, and a number
of large financial institutions having allegedly provided material
0
support to terrorist organizations. l1

On August 7, 2003, the Saudi Binladin Group,"° a defendant in
virtually all of the pending September 11th lawsuits, filed a motion to
transfer and consolidate the Burnett and Ashton lawsuits, along with
four other civil cases arising from the September 11th attacks. 3 The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation agreed to the pre-trial
consolidation of these six lawsuits into a single action before Judge

Casey in the Southern District of New York."° Like its progeny, the
consolidated action, In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001
("In re TerroristAttacks I"),15 alleges a number of statutory causes of

action-many arising under the ATA

°6

Unlike previous terrorism lawsuits, however, the September l1th

Cases have taken special aim at the banks and financial institutions
whose "continued provision of banking services to [terrorist groups]
facilitates their illegal activities."'

°7

The September 11th Cases remain

in their early stages more than five years after the attacks, although
several of the banking defendants have already filed motions to

100. See Jennifer Senior, A Nation Unto Himself, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 14, 2004, at
36.
101. See Third Amended Complaint, supranote 54, at 189-208.
102. The Saudi Binladin Group is one of the Kingdom's largest and most successful
corporate conglomerates, with assets estimated in excess of $5 billion. The Group was
initially founded by Mohammad bin Laden, Osama bin Laden's father. Corporate
executives continually profess the Group's disdain for terrorist activities, while leaders
insist that Osama bin Laden has maintained no connection with the Group since being
stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1994 for engaging in terrorist activities and criticizing
the House of Saud. See generally Joseph Rense, It's Business as Usual for the Bin Laden
Group, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 13, 2002 (discussing generally the Saudi Binladin Group).
103. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L.
2003); NANCY CHANG & ALAN KABAT, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SUMMARY
OF RECENT COURT RULINGS ON TERRORISM-RELATED MATTERS HAVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS 31 (2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, "[w]hen civil actions
involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such
actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
104. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
105. In re Terrorist Attacks 1,349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
106. See id. at 780 (setting forth the plaintiffs' causes of action).
107. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571,576 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

dismiss for failure to state a claim under the ATA. 118 Building upon
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Boim, courts thus far have denied
the vast majority of the defendants' motions to dismiss.1"9 Although
the defendants claim to be providing only routine banking services,
courts have determined that in light of the "knowing and intentional
nature of the [defendants'] activities, there is nothing 'routine' about
the services" that the banks have allegedly provided.110
While much of the litigation stemming from the September 11th
attacks remains in its early stages, it appears that the ATA will
provide the victims of the attacks with their most viable cause of
action against terrorist entities. 1 Contemporary terrorism lawsuits,
however, have also stated causes of action under the ATCA 112 and the
civil provisions of RICO." 3
These federal statutes "provide
additional avenues of relief for victims of terrorism ... [which]
typically have been brought ... in combination with other causes of
' These statutes are generally less effective and more limited
action."114
in scope than the ATA,115 but they nevertheless provide plaintiffs
with a supplemental cause of action against terrorists and their
private sponsors.
During President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress
just days after the September 11th attacks, he remarked that "[a]lQaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not
making money; [rather] its goal is remaking the world.... ,",6 In light
of this comparison, it is unsurprising that there was significant
speculation and debate in the legal community regarding whether
terrorism victims could successfully plead a cause of action under
RICO-a statute originally aimed at combating organized crime." 7
108. See, e.g., id. at 579.
109. See, e.g., id. at 591 (denying the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion on all but four
counts).
110. Id. at 588.
111. Telephone Interview with John Moore, supranote 50.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
114. Strauss, supra note 14, at 710 ("This is important, because the plaintiffs suing
under [statutes such as the] AEDPA will need to find an applicable cause of action to
invoke if the AEDPA... does not itself provide a cause of action.").
115. Telephone Interview with John Moore, supra note 50.
116. President George W. Bush, Televised Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter President Bush's Speech to Congress],
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
117. See generally Zvi Joseph, The Application of RICO to International Terrorism, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1071, 1084 (1990) (arguing that RICO "is a potentially powerful
weapon available to the federal government in the war on terrorism [which] should be
expanded to facilitate its use against terrorist organizations"); Stephen Warneck, A
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Supporters of the concept argued that clandestine networks of global
terrorists were virtually indistinguishable from the criminal
organizations being targeted by RICO." 8 Before this notion could be
tested in court, however, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT ACT
("PATRIOT Act"), 19 which amended RICO to include "any act that
is indictable under any provision listed" in the criminal liability
120
section of the ATA.
By amending the provisions of RICO to include acts of
international terrorism, Congress conveyed its manifest intent to
provide plaintiffs another avenue of relief in addition to what had
already been conferred by the ATA.
Despite Congressional
intentions, however, courts have been quick to dismiss RICO claims
that have arisen from acts of terrorism. 121 In In re TerroristAttacks I,
for example, the court began its analysis by noting that "[c]ivil RICO
is an unusually potent weapon ...[and that] courts should strive to
flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of the
litigation. ' 122 The court, therefore, ultimately dismissed the RICO
portions of the complaint, noting that the plaintiffs had not alleged
that the defendants were "central figures" in the schemes underlying
the terrorist acts-a requirement for liability under the statute. 23
While plaintiffs have encountered a rough road in pursuing their
claims under civil RICO provisions, they have been eminently more
successful in using the ATCA to establish liability for acts of
terrorism. In contrast to the ATA, which provides only a cause of
action for U.S. nationals,12 4 the ATCA expands the class of potential
Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA To Attack the Financial Strength of
International Terrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV. 177, 211 (1998) (discussing the
application of RICO statutes to contemporary terrorist operations).
118. E.g., Warneck, supra note 117, at 193-94.
119. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272. The USA PATRIOT Act, while controversial, is aimed primarily at
strengthening the already broad prerogative of the "Justice Department so it can better
detect and disrupt terrorist threats."
Remarks on Signing the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 423 (Mar.

9, 2006). The legislation also substantially facilitates the ability of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to share information and resources. See id.
120. USA PATRIOT Act § 813.
121. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks 1, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(dismissing the plaintiff's RICO claims against the SAAR Network, a collection of twelve
individual organizations).
122. Id. at 827 (citing Katzman v. Victoria's Secret, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
123. Id. at 828.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000) ("Any nationalof the United States ...may sue ... in

any appropriate district court of the United States." (emphasis added)).
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plaintiffs in terrorism lawsuits by permitting foreign nationals to bring
suit in a federal district court for a tort committed in "violation of the
law of nations."12' 5 Historically, the ATCA has been strikingly
"underutilized in cases involving terrorism.' 12 6 Only recently has the
ATCA been used to allow foreign nationals to bring suits against
terrorist entities under theories similar to those advanced by U.S.
nationals under the ATA. 127
In the September 11th Cases, the plaintiffs' only substantive
barrier to pursuing a cause of action under the ATCA was convincing
the court that an act of international terrorism constitutes a violation
of the "law of nations.""12 In one of the more memorable rebukes of
the ATCA, the court in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic'29
concluded that, even though "this nation unequivocally condemns all
terrorist attacks, that sentiment is not universal," and "[g]iven this
division ... terrorist attacks [do not] amount to a law of nations
violation."' 3 ° After Tel-Oren, however, some courts substantially
broadened the class of activities that run afoul of the "law of
nations."''
In In re Terrorist Attacks I, for example, Judge Casey,
relying on a strong legacy of federal case law, has already ruled that

"aircraft

hijacking is generally recognized as a violation of
'132

international law.'

In light of the generally favorable treatment that the ATCA
received from federal courts in the two decades following Tel-Oren, it
appeared, at least initially, that foreign nationals would be permitted

to pursue private terrorist entities under the ATCA in virtually the
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.").
126. Strauss, supra note 14, at 710. On the other hand, "the scope of the ATCA has
[recently] expanded with the addition of its legislative cousin, the TVPA [Torture Victim
Protection Act]. In enacting the [TVPA], Congress intended to supply an unambiguous
cause of action for both aliens and U.S. citizens ..... Id.; see also S. REP. No. 102-249, at
4 (1991) (explaining that the TVPA provides "an unambiguous basis for a cause of action
that has been successfully maintained under" the ATCA).
127. See, e.g., Burnett 1,274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 92 (D.D.C. 2003) (alleging a cause of action
on behalf of 128 foreign nationals under the provisions of the ATCA).
128. In re TerroristAttacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
129. 517 F. Supp. 774 (D.D.C. 1981).
130. Id. at 795.
131. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds, 48 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that "certain forms of conduct by private individuals may violate the law of
nations even where the individual in question does not act under color of law").
132. In re Terrorist Attacks 1, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (citing Bigio, 239 F.3d at 447-49;
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240).
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same manner that U.S. nationals have pursued these entities using the
ATA. 13 3 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, added another layer of
complexity to the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,' which
involved a Mexican national that brought suit under the ATCA after
he was kidnapped by agents of the American Drug Enforcement
Agency and taken to the United States to stand trial.'35 Sosa did not
involve issues directly pertaining to civil terrorism litigation, although
the case did afford the Court an opportunity to revisit the deceptively
simplistic provisions of the ATCA. While Justice Souter's majority
opinion refused to adopt Judge Bork's earlier position in Tel-Oren,"6
the Court did elect to narrow the class of litigants under the ATCA
by requiring that a "law of nations" violation "rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms [it had previously] recognized." 37 By balancing both
conservative and liberal approaches, the Court seems to have left
further development of the ATCA to the lower federal courts. 38 At
least one legal expert believes that an issue of clarity still exists
regarding whether civil terrorism lawsuits state valid causes of action
under the ATCA.'39 Consequently, it remains to be seen what effect
the Sosa decision may have on foreign plaintiffs pursuing terrorism
lawsuits under the ATCA.
Aside from the directly applicable federal statutes that
enumerate a specific cause of action for victims of terrorism, common
law tort claims also provide plaintiffs with additional causes of action,
such as battery, assault, infliction of emotional distress, wrongful
death, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and false imprisonment. 4 °
Indeed, many plaintiffs have found that the most judicious approach
to terrorism lawsuits has been to aggregate their claims using "a
133. See Telephone Interview with Moore, supra note 50.
134. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
135. Id. at 697-99.
136. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) (determining that the appellant's interpretation of "section 1350 is too
sweeping. It would authorize tort suits for the vindication of any international legal right
... [which] would be inconsistent with the severe limitations on individually initiated
enforcement inherent in international law itself, and would run counter to constitutional
limits on the role of federal courts.").
137. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
138. See M. Christie Helmer & Brian W. Esler, Litigating Claims Under the Alien Tort
Claims Statute After SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN (Miller Nash, LLP), http://www.
millernash.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=1529 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
139. Telephone Interview with John Moore, supranote 50.
140. Strauss, supra note 14, at 739.
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combination of all available causes of action, each of which will apply
with varying effectiveness against particular defendants.., depending
on the facts" of the particular case. 4'
B.

Effecting Service of Process on TerroristDefendants
As a result of federal terrorism statutes such as the ATA,
virtually all civil suits arising from an act of terrorism are filed in
federal court, despite the fact that a lawsuit in a state court of general
competence may sometimes appear to be an attractive proposition. 42
Before federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the
sometimes arduous "requirement of service of summons must be
satisfied."' 43 The reality that many terrorist defendants are generally
difficult to locate only adds another layer of complexity to a process
that is already frustrating to many plaintiffs.'"
As a practical matter, service of process issues rarely arise in the
context of foreign corporations that have extensive contacts with the
United States. In Linde v. Arab Bank, 45 for example, service of
process was easily effectuated by simply serving the appropriate agent
at the defendant bank's New York offices.146 Likewise, the plaintiffs
in the September 11th Cases have encountered little difficulty with
serving process on large financial institutions with a significant
business nexus to the United States.147 Despite being able to serve
process on some defendants with relative ease, however, plaintiffs
have encountered more challenges in attempting to serve process on
terrorist organizations, foreign government officials, and Islamic
48
charities operating out of the Middle East.
141. Id. ("By aggregating these claims, victims and their families can target terrorist
groups, officials and other individuals, along with the foreign states, organizations, and
agencies who sponsor them.").
142. John Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an
Alternative to CriminalProsecution,12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 47 (explaining that, because
state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over transitory torts committed outside of the
United States, a suit could proceed in state court if a plaintiff were able to properly serve a
defendant, obtain personal jurisdiction, and survive a motion for forum non conveniens).
143. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
144. See Stratton, supra note 57, at 33.
145. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
146. Id. at 571.
147. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks 1, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(conducting a thorough minimum contacts analysis with regard to the defendants, but
acknowledging that process had already been served consistent with the ATA's
nationwide service of process provision).
148. See, e.g., Smith ex rel Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing some of the inherent difficulties in serving process on bin
Laden, al-Qaeda, and Taliban officials).
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In an effort to facilitate service of process on terrorist
organizations and their sponsors, the ATA includes a nationwide
service of process provision that allows for service "in any district
where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent."' 49 Citing this
provision, the court in Estates of Ungar v. The PalestinianAuthority5 '
addressed the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' service of process on the
terrorist group Hamas. 15' The plaintiffs in Ungar contended that
process had been properly served on Muhammed Salah, the chief of
Hamas' military operations in the Middle East who was residing in
the United States at the time of the lawsuit.'
While addressing the
sufficiency of service, the Ungar court weighed the application of
Rule 4(h)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for
service on an "unincorporated association ...by delivering a copy of
the summons and of the complaint to an officer or ...general agent"
of the organization.153 The court accepted the plaintiff's argument
that Hamas qualified as an "unincorporated association" because it
was " 'composed of individuals, without a legal identity apart from its
membership, formed for specific objectives.' "154 Because of Salah's
high level in the Hamas hierarchy, the court also found that it was
reasonable to conclude that he had the authority to exercise his
discretion in handling the lawsuit; the plaintiffs, therefore, had
properly effectuated service of process.155
Defendants in other terrorism lawsuits, however, may not be as
well known or as easy to locate as Hamas. 15 6 In cases involving
foreign defendants without known agents in the United States, courts
have turned to Rule 4(f), which permits service upon individuals in a
foreign country by any "means not prohibited by international
'
agreement as may be directed by the court."157
Accordingly, in the
vast majority of cases arising out of the September 11th attacks,

149. 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (2000).

150. 304 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.R.I. 2004).
151. Id. at 257-60.
152. Id. at 258.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1).
154. Ungar, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (quoting Estates of Ungar ex rel Strachman v.
Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.R.I. 2001)). Specifically, the Ungar court
defined an unincorporated association " 'as a body of persons acting together and using
certain methods for prosecuting a special purpose or common enterprise.' " Id. (quoting
Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir. 1985)).
155. Id. at 259 (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave
Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
vacated, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991)).
156. Stratton, supra note 57, at 38.
157. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f).
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courts have permitted service on terrorist organizations and their

leaders by publication.1 58 The court in Mwani v. Bin Laden,159 for

example, found that service by publication " 'was reasonably
calculated to apprise [the alleged terrorists] of the lawsuit and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.' "160
Although there has been little hesitation in permitting service by
publication for terrorist defendants, courts have been far less willing
to allow this type of service with respect to foreign-based
organizations whose location is more readily ascertainable.
In the
case of Islamic charities operating out of the Middle East, the Burnett

court refused to permit service by publication and insisted that
plaintiffs identify a more effective method of service. 162 As a result,
plaintiffs in the September 11th Cases have attempted to utilize the
laws of Saudi Arabia to effectuate service of process on a number of
Saudi nationals and Islamic charities operating out of the Arabian
Peninsula.163 Much to the plaintiffs' frustration, however, Saudi
Arabia's legal system-premised on a complex morass of Islamic

law-provides very little guidance in their efforts to serve process
within the Kingdom." 6 As an additional source of dissatisfaction, the
plaintiffs' efforts have been impeded by the Saudi government, which

has expressed very little interest in facilitating service of process in
lawsuits where the Saudi government itself has become a common
target.65 Illustrative of the dangers inherent in serving terrorist
organizations, one process agent who was hired to effect service on
158. See, e.g., Smith ex rel Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (allowing service by publication in the case of bin Laden and al-Qaeda,
but requiring service upon an agent in the case of the Taliban government).
159. 417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
160. Id. at 8 (quoting the district court's order).
161. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
162. See id. (alluding to Burnett 11, 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003)).
163. Id.
164. As one commentator noted,
[Tihe [Saudi] constitution establishes that the Koran, the holy book of Islam, will
be the law of the land. Of the 6,236 verses of the Koran, only 500 or so contain
instructions that could be taken as moral or legal rules. However, around these
verses and the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad has developed a
complex legal system.
Mary Carter Duncan, Playing by Their Rules: The Death Penalty and Foreignersin Saudi
Arabia, 27 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 238 (1998); see also John Daniszewski, Judging
the Divine Law of Islam, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at Al.
165. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20. See generally Burnett 1I, 292 F. Supp.
2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating a cause of action against Prince Turki A1-Faisal bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud and Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, both of whom are prominent members
of the House of Saud).

2008]

TAKING TERRORISM TO COURT

several Saudi charities was kidnapped and later found beheaded on
the outskirts of Riyadh-demonstrating one of the more tragic
setbacks in subjecting terrorist groups to American-style justice."6
C. EstablishingPersonal& Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Though effectuating service of process is required in order to
establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant in federal court, it is
A plaintiff must also demonstrate a
not in itself sufficient.
"constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and
'
Terrorist organizations are considered unincorporated
the forum."167
Consequently, these
associations for jurisdictional purposes. 168
organizations may be subjected to a personal jurisdiction test similar
to that for corporations-whether minimum contacts exist between
169
the organization and the forum in which the suit has been filed.
American rules of personal jurisdiction, though, are highly
controversial from an international perspective.Y° Indeed, subjecting
foreign defendants to the American legal system based upon mere
''minimum contacts" is regarded by many in the international
community as an "exorbitant" basis of federal jurisdiction.' In light
of the international community's reservations, courts in the United
States, understanding the competing policy considerations of
subjecting foreign defendants to American justice, tend to exercise
"[gireat care and reserve ... when extending our notions of personal
jurisdiction into the international field."' 72 In the context of terrorism
lawsuits, however, courts have been far less prone to exercising such
jurisdictional restraint, relying instead on the notion that "no foreign

166. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20; see also Senior, supra note 100.
167. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,104 (1987).
168. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
169. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987)
(holding that minimum contacts suffice to establish personal jurisdiction in the absence of
some fundamental unfairness); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-82
(1985) (affirming that minimum contacts existed where the defendant entered into a
contract in the forum at issue); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945)
(articulating the minimum contacts analysis for the first time).
170. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 169, 208-12 (1999).
171. Id. at 211; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 421 cmt. e (1987).

172. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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terrorist today can fairly assert a lack of 'fair warning' that it could be

'haled into court' in the United States." '7 3
In early terrorism lawsuits filed on behalf of victims of the
Palestinian Intifadah,174 American courts freely exercised personal
jurisdiction over well-known organizations such as Hamas and the
Palestinian Authority, relying in part on their extensive "commercial
and lobbying activities" in the United States.175

In Ungar, for

example, the court rested its basis for jurisdiction on the affidavits of
international terrorism expert, Yehudit Barsky,176 who outlined
Hamas' "extensive fundraising, operational planning, recruitment,
propaganda, public relations, money laundering, investment, and
communication activities" in the United States. 77 Unlike Hamas,
however, most terrorist organizations have less notorious affiliations
with the United States, and courts have correspondingly been more
hesitant to exercise general personal jurisdiction.178
Following the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi,
Kenya, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Mwani v.
Bin Laden179 addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction over al-

173. Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't, 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (D.D.C. 2004)
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
174. "The Intifadah was a ... spontaneous grassroots uprising that attempted to end
Israel's twenty year illegal military occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East
Jerusalem." Ardi Imseis, "Moderate" Torture On Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli
Supreme CourtJudgment Concerningthe Legality of GeneralSecurity Service Interrogation
Methods, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 328, 335 n.66 (2001). Though technically lasting from
1987 to 1993, the violence stemming from the first Intifadah continued well into the late
1990s as Palestinians "witnessed an unprecedented level of mass participation and
mobilization at every stratum of Palestinian society against the Israeli occupation
authorities." Id. Israel characterized the Intifadah as "a violent war waged ... by
Palestinian 'terrorists,' " and indeed, Palestinian-based terror organizations carried out a
number of attacks against Israeli interests in the region. Id.
175. Milin, supra note 18, at S13 (citing Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v.
Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86-91 (D.R.I. 2001)).
176. Mr. Barsky is the director of the Middle East and International Terrorist division
of the American Jewish Committee. See Estates of Ungar ex rel Strachman v. Palestinian
Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 255-56 (D.R.I. 2004). After acquiring his master's degree in
international relations and Near Eastern studies from New York University, Mr. Barsky
spent thirteen years researching and investigating the operations of Middle Eastern
terrorist organizations operating in the United States. See id. at 256.
177. Id. at 256 (referring to Hamas' activities in at least six states: Texas, Louisiana,
Missouri, Virginia, Illinois, and New York).
178. See, e.g., Smith ex rel Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220-22
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing some of the difficulties in establishing personal jurisdiction
over bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban government).
179. 417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

20081

TAKING TERRORISM TO COURT

Qaeda defendants." 8 In an earlier ruling, the district court in Mwani

had refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over bin Laden and alQaeda, citing the lack of "specific, physical contacts" between the
defendants and the District of Columbia. 8' On appeal, however, the

court addressed the district court's "focus on specific, physical
contacts between the defendants and the forum," which it considered
to be the "fundamental problem with the [district] court's analysis."' 82
The court found that even though " 'the constitutional touchstone
remains whether the defendant purposefully established minimum

contacts in the forum,' the 'forseeability' of causing injury in the
forum can establish such contacts where 'the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum ...are such that he should reasonably

anticipate being haled into [an American] court.' "183 Thus, the court
claimed jurisdiction over both bin Laden and al-Qaeda, reasoning

that each defendant's conscious determination to direct their terror
operations at the United States should have caused them to anticipate
that they would fall within the jurisdictional purview of American
courts.'
In light of the court's decision in Mwani, plaintiffs in the
September l1th Cases have experienced little resistance in establishing
personal jurisdiction over terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.'8 5
To further facilitate their efforts, plaintiffs have consistently utilized
Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which " 'fill[s] a
gap in the enforcement of federal law' " by allowing "courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants with sufficient contacts
with the United States generally, but insufficient contacts with any
one state in particular."' 86 As a result, terrorist defendants that
180. See id. at 4-14.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
184. Id. at 13 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
185. See generally Ozan 0. Varol, Substantive Due Process, Plenary-Power Doctrine,
and Minimum Contacts: Arguments for Overcoming the Obstacle of Asserting Personal
Jurisdiction over Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 92 IOWA L. REV. 297 (2006)
(discussing, among other things, the primary means by which most courts have been able
to establish personal jurisdiction over terrorist defendants).
186. In re Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's note; United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F.
Supp. 609, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). The court explained:
For jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), there must be a federal claim, personal
jurisdiction must not exist over the defendant in New York or any other state, and
the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole such
that the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate Fifth Amendment due process.
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"engage[] in unabashedly malignant actions directed at and felt in"
the United States will satisfy the minimum contacts requirement for
establishing personal jurisdiction.'87
Though plaintiffs have discovered a relatively wieldy path to
establishing personal jurisdiction over organizations that physically
carry out acts of international terrorism, courts have been more
skeptical of exercising jurisdiction over defendants who may have
provided financial and logistical support to terrorist groups, but who
were not directly involved in the attacks themselves. 18 In order to
establish that defendants who provide support to terrorist groups
have "purposefully directed their activities at the United States," the
court in In re TerroristAttacks II held that the "Plaintiffs must make a
prima facie showing of each Defendant's personal or direct
participation in the conduct giving rise to [the] Plaintiff's injuries. '
And although the court "does not require direct participation in the
attacks themselves," there must be at least some modicum of
"participation in al Qaeda's terrorist agenda." 1
In an effort to demonstrate that the defendants directed their
activities at the United States by providing support to terrorists, the
plaintiffs in In re Terrorist Attacks I have contended that the
"Defendants knew that the primary target of... al Qaeda's campaign
of terror was the United States and that by providing assistance to
these terrorists ...[the] Defendants aimed their conduct at the
United States."19 ' Some defendants have countered this assertion by
directing the court's attention to In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust
Litigation," where the Second Circuit required evidence of "primary
participa[tion] in the intentional wrongdoing" before finding
sufficient contacts to justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction.1 93

Id. (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. at 617).
187. In re Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 558 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing
Mwani, 417 F.3d at 13).
188. See id. at 556-64.
189. Id. at 558 (citing In re TerroristAttacks 1, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 807, 809).
190. Id.
191. In re Terrorist Attacks 1,349 F. Supp. 2d at 807 (relying on the three most recent
terrorism cases of that time period: Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
290 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2003); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C.
2000); and Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y.
1998), affd in part, dismissed in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998)).
192. 334 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2003).
193. Id. at 208 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)) (dismissing a
lawsuit against a South Korean corporation after the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
the defendant was a direct participant in the price fixing activities that were directed at the
United States).
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553

Because of the eclectic m6lange of defendants in the September l1th

Cases, the courts appear to have chosen to resolve most issues
pertaining to personal jurisdiction on an individualized basis as
opposed to applying a consistent comprehensive standard.'94

Once courts have conferred personal jurisdiction over a
defendant by analyzing service of process and the defendant's

minimum contacts with the United States, plaintiffs must still
establish subject matter jurisdiction by demonstrating that their
lawsuit "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."' 95 Subject matter jurisdiction, though often heavily
contested in lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism, has been the

subject of minimal judicial controversy in civil cases against private
terrorist organizations.196

Courts have uniformly established that

subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the "plain language" of the
ATA, which authorizes lawsuits "in any appropriate district court of
the United States."'" Additionally, supplemental causes of action
under the ATCA and civil RICO provisions also arise under federal

statutes, placing them squarely within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 198
D. Defending Choice of Venue in Terrorism Lawsuits

Immediately prior to the surge in terrorism litigation spawned by
the September 11th Cases, some speculated that the doctrine of forum

194. One example of the court's individualized application of minimum contacts
analysis is demonstrated in the case of several non-governmental Saudi princes, who
despite being well connected to the United States (Prince Salman, for example, maintains
significant interests in American corporations and frequently travels to the United States,
where he once paid a business visit to the Bush White House) were found to have
insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. On the other hand,
institutional defendants (most notably financial conglomerates and Islamic charities)
appear to receive substantially less scrutiny, perhaps demonstrating the court's respect for
international diplomacy by more readily dismissing suits against influential members of
the House of Saud.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). Plaintiffs may also predicate subject matter jurisdiction
on the federal diversity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), though it is important to note that
diversity competence is inapplicable in suits between both foreign plaintiffs and foreign
defendants. See Jack Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International
Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 6, at 115.
196. See Rubin v. HAMAS-Islamic Resistance Movement, No. 02-0975, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20883, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (outlining the relatively
straightforward nature of subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving terrorist
defendants).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000); Rubin, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6.
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
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Indeed, Congress included specific venue
that create a "heightened standard of
asserting forum non conveniens 0 1 Under
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any, obstacles to plaintiffs
their private sponsors."°
provisions within the ATA
dismissal" for defendants
the ATA,

[A] district court shall not dismiss any action... on the grounds
of the inconvenience or inappropriateness of the forum chosen,
unless-(1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court that
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over all the
defendants; (2) that foreign court is significantly more
convenient and appropriate; and (3) that foreign court offers a
remedy which is substantially the
same as the one available in
2°
2
the courts of the United States.
Even in those cases where the act of terrorism giving rise to the
suit occurred in a foreign jurisdiction, courts have expressed an
adamant refusal to dismiss these cases in light of the venue provisions
of the ATA. °3 In Linde v. Arab Bank,2 4 for example, the defendant,
a Jordanian financial institution, moved for dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds, contending that the plaintiff's claims should be
adjudicated before a Jordanian court.2 5
In dismissing such
arguments, the Linde court not only rejected the notion that "a
Jordanian court would be significantly more convenient and
appropriate," but also found that a foreign court would be unlikely to
provide " 'substantially the same'" remedy, as required by the
ATA.0 6
As a matter of first impression, issues of forum non conveniens
appear to be relatively straightforward in the context of civil
terrorism litigation. In 2001, however, Congress enacted the Air
199. This doctrine allows federal district courts to dismiss a case if they determine that
there is an adequate alternative forum and certain factors weigh in favor of adjudicating
the case in another forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-57 (1981)
(holding, among other things, that the interests of foreign plaintiffs should be afforded less
deference than those of domestic defendants); Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 195, at
130.
200. Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 195, at 130.
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2334(d) (2000); Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 591 n.13
(E.D.N.Y 2005).
202. § 2334(d) (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 591 n.13 (noting that the defendant, on trial for
facilitating terrorism attacks during the Second Intifadah, "failed to meet its burden of
showing that [the] heightened standard for dismissal under the ATA [had] been met").
204. 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
205. See id. at 591 n.13.
206. Id. (citing § 2334(d)).

2008]

TAKING TERRORISM TO COURT

Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act ("ATSSSA") 27
which granted the Southern District of New York "exclusive
jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim ...resulting from

or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11,
2001.'2°8
When read in isolation, ATSSSA appears to
"unambiguous[ly] ...require that [a] plaintiffs' claims be heard in the
Southern District of New York" regardless of the defendant or the

statutory basis for the plaintiff's cause of action. 2' Nevertheless,
courts have been consistently unwilling to enforce the venue
provisions of ATSSSA to their maximum potential. 210 A number of
courts have toiled over the legislative history of ATSSSA, 1

ultimately determining that Congress did not intend to centralize all
terrorism lawsuits, but rather to "promote the efficiency and
rationality of litigation... [while] limit[ing] the aggregate exposure of
212

the non-terrorist defendants.,
The Burnett case was the first of the September 11th Cases to
directly address the venue provisions of the ATA. 213 Although the
court carefully scrutinized the available legislative history, its ultimate
decision turned on the issue of whether the ATSSSA venue
provisions could be interpreted in a manner that did not come
"irreconcilably into conflict with the ATA," which allows for
terrorism lawsuits to be filed in " 'any appropriate district court of the
United States.' ",214 Ultimately, the court found that "giving a narrow
construction to the 'exclusive jurisdiction' language of Section

207. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp.
IV 2004)).
208. § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241 (emphasis added).
209. Burnett 1, 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D.D.C. 2003).
210. See, e.g., Hudson News Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387-88 (D.N.J.
2003) ("[M]ost, if not all courts addressing the jurisdictional effect of the Air Safety Act
have narrowly construed the scope of Section 408(b)(1) and (3) ...[and] this Court is, like
its sister courts, reluctant to attribute expansive effect to those provisions."); Goodrich
Corp. v. Winterthur Int'l Am. Ins. Co., 2002 WL 31833646, at *4 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(holding that the ATSSSA applies exclusively to victims of the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11th and not to insurance coverage actions).
211. See, e.g., Burnett 1, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (citing 147 CONG. REC. S9589, 9589-603
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001); 147 CONG. REC. H5894, 5894-918 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001))
(struggling over the "meager" legislative history, but ultimately "discern[ing] ...that the
driving force behind ATSSSA was Congress's concern for the financial survival of the
airline industry").
212. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Burnett 1,274 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (citing 270 F. Supp. 2d at 371).
213. See Burnett 1, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 98-99.
214. Id. at 95 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000)).
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408(b)(3)" allowed the legislation to be harmonized with the ATA.21 5
Consequently, the Burnett court permitted suits arising from the
September 11th attacks to be filed outside of the Southern District of
New York so long as the plaintiffs stated a cause of action against
terrorists or their private sponsors.21 6
As a practical matter, the reluctance of courts "to attribute
expansive effect to [the] provisions" of ATSSSA has been only of
academic value.2"7 Shortly after the Burnett decision, the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel consolidated several cases related to the attacks of
September 11th in the Southern District of New York, 1 8 thereby
alleviating the risk of the cases being overturned on appeal because
they were tried in the incorrect jurisdiction.219 As a consequence of
the ATA, terrorism lawsuits arising from new instances of terrorism
will continue to be filed in a wide variety of federal district courts, and
defendants will face significant challenges in asserting forum non
conveniens in light of the heightened standard of dismissal under the
ATA.
E.

Pre-TrialDiscovery Against TerroristEntities

Engaging in pre-trial discovery against terrorist defendants in an
international forum can be exceedingly difficult, requiring an
extraordinary amount of financial and logistical resources. 220 And
even though the plaintiffs in the September 11th Cases have won a
number of intermediate courtroom victories, their ultimate success
will depend upon an unprecedented investigative effort that will span
the far reaches of the Earth. Nathan Lewin, a Washington lawyer
who has won wide acclaim for his victories against terrorist
215. Id. (citing Hudson News Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88). Furthermore, the court
noted that "Congress did not 'clearly express' an intention that Section 408(b)(3) was to
render the ATA's jurisdictional provision ineffective, although it is 'normally expected to
be aware of its previous enactments and to provide clear statement of repeal if it intends
to do so.' " Id. (citing Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1063 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
216. Id. at 92-96.
217. Hudson News Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
218. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2003); supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
219. Terence J. Kivlan, Trillion Dollar Lawsuit To Be Heard in Manhattan, STATEN
ISLAND ADVANCE, Feb. 20, 2004, at A5.
220. Kellie McGowan, Following the Money Trail: Can American Lawyers Use
American and International Discovery Procedures To Prove the Link Between
InternationalTerroristActs and Financiers?,18 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 175, 196 (2004)

(noting the likelihood that defendants will file numerous motions, including "motions for
protective orders, as well as challenges to each form of discovery the plaintiffs may
attempt").
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defendants, 221 estimates that more than one million hours went into
the Boim case, 222 much of which was expended in pre-trial discovery
efforts.2 2
By honing their focus on financial institutions and charitable
organizations, the plaintiffs in the September 11th Cases will have to
provide evidence that these defendants knowingly and willingly
financed acts of terrorism. 22 4 Establishing that these defendants had
the requisite constructive or actual knowledge is going to require
more than mere evidence of business deals and financial
transactions. 225 Further enhancing the complexity of the pre-trial
discovery process, the banking institutions 226 having been implicated
in the September l1th Cases are intricate organizations with
substantial holdings throughout the Middle East. One of the most
prominent defendants, the Al Baraka Investment and Development
Corporation, is a Saudi financial conglomerate with significant ties to
the Sudan and a number of subsidiaries scattered across several
continents.
It is, therefore, not surprising that attorneys in the
September l1th Cases expect to be immersed in the largest discovery
effort ever conducted in federal court.228
Fortunately, the American discovery procedures outlined in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are exceedingly broad and allow
plaintiffs to engage in a virtual fishing expedition for any information
that is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. ' 229 But in order to utilize these permissive American
discovery rules, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the party upon

221. See generally An Assessment of the Tools, supra note 13 (addressing Lewin's work
on terrorist-related lawsuits); Lewin & Lewin, LLP, http://www.lewinlewin.com/nathan
.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2007) (providing a brief biography for Mr. Lewin).
222. Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
223. An Assessment of the Tools, supra note 13 (statement of Nathan Lewin, Lewin &
Lewin, LLP) (noting that without the help and volunteer work of several legal
organizations, the firm "would not [have been] able to continue with this exceedingly
important lawsuit").
224. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1012, 1016-21 (holding that funding simpliciter, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish liability and that plaintiffs must demonstrate willful
knowledge of the terrorist activities).
225. See McGowan, supra note 220, at 180.
226. The banking defendants implicated in the September l1th Cases include Al Baraka
Investment & Development Corp., Al Shamal Islamic Bank, AI-Rajhi Banking &
Investment Corporation, National Commercial Bank, and Faisal Islamic Bank. See Third
Amended Complaint, supra note 54, at 230-46.
227. McGowan, supra note 220, at 180; see Third Amended Complaint, supra note 54,
at 230-35.
228. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
229. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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which discovery is being served is subject to the Federal Rules by
establishing personal jurisdiction.23 ° When discovery is being served
on a party to the lawsuit that is already subject to the jurisdiction of
the court, the discovery process has generally proceeded with little
fanfare.231
However, a significant amount of discovery in the
September 11th Cases will involve non-parties who are outside the
jurisdictional purview of the American courts.232 And although the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain provisions for conducting
international discovery,23 3 these methods are not widely accepted
23 4
internationally.

The international community has been more accepting of the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad ("Hague
Evidence Convention"), 235 which came about in the 1970s in an effort
23 6
to facilitate discovery procedures in the international forum.
Nevertheless, because no Middle Eastern country is currently a
signatory to the agreement, the Hague Evidence Convention has only
been utilized in order to obtain documents from a handful of
European entities.237 In Saudi Arabia, where plaintiffs tend to focus

their most extensive discovery efforts, there "are no outlined
procedures for pre-trial discovery ...and it is unclear what response
the [Saudi] court ...would have to service of pre-trial discovery
'238
requests based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Unfazed by the procedural and diplomatic encumbrances of
international discovery, the plaintiffs in the September 11th Cases

have frequently renounced the formal channels of discovery in favor
230. See supra Part I.C.
231. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
232. See id.
233. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) ("Depositions may be taken in a foreign country
(1) pursuant to any applicable treaty or convention, or (2) pursuant to a letter of request
...or (3) on notice before a person authorized to administer oaths ...or (4) before a
person commissioned by the court....").
234. Hidekazu Kayakawa, Discovering Evidence in International Disputes-American
Discovery Procedures and the Hague Convention Procedure, ILL. BUS. L.J., Nov. 8, 2005,
http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinoisbusiness law-soc/2005/11/discovering-evi.html.
In
many countries, the discovery process is conducted primarily by the courts, as opposed to
the respective parties. Id. Accordingly, American discovery procedures may sometimes
be perceived as an interference with the province of the foreign court.
235. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
236. See Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist.
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (stating that the Hague Evidence Convention
"prescribes certain procedures by which a judicial authority in one contracting state may
request evidence located in another contracting state").
237. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
238. McGowan, supra note 220, at 189.
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of forming their own "team of investigators from around the world
...to probe al Qaeda's financial links. ' 239 Even prior to the official
commencement of pre-trial discovery in the Spring of 2006, plaintiffs'
counsel in the September l1th Cases had already completed a
significant fact finding process2' led by French terrorism expert JeanCharles Brisard, the author of the most exhaustive study ever
completed on the financial network of the bin Laden organization.241
Ron Motley, "who has made a career of coaxing documents from the
shadows, 24 2 has already spent $12 million-much of it his own
money-"bankroll[ing] a worldwide intelligence-gathering operation
that makes the discovery process, ordinarily marked by subpoenas
and dry depositions, read like a Tom Clancy novel. ' 243 Motley has
retained the services of ten foreign informants, one of whom is a
former Taliban official. 2 " Through highly unconventional methods of
discovery, the plaintiffs in the September 11th Cases have also
2 46
245
acquired foreign intelligence reports and computer hard drives
used by the Taliban government, al-Qaeda operatives, and Islamic
charities operating out of Europe and Asia. 47 Motley and his team
have now shifted the focus of their discovery process to documents
that have already been culled by foreign governments, thereby
curtailing the arduous and oftentimes unsuccessful process of vetting
and authenticating evidence received from private informants across
the world.248
239. Id. at 183.
240. To prevent the filing of frivolous lawsuits, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that counsel investigate the merits of their claim in order to establish a
good faith belief that the defendants are indeed responsible for the plaintiffs injuries. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
241. See generally JEAN-CHARLES BRISARD & GUILLAUME DASQUIt, FORBIDDEN
TRUTH:

U.S.-TALIBAN

SECRET OIL DIPLOMACY, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE FAILED

SEARCH FOR BIN LADEN (Lucy Rounds trans., 2002) (chronicling the history and

financial breadth of the bin Laden network).
242. Senior, supra note 100, at 36.
243. Id. at 38, 40; see Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
244. Senior, supra note 100, at 40.
245. Plaintiffs have obtained over two million pages of documents, including Albanian
intelligence reports on bin Laden's business dealings in the Balkans and various Swiss
banking records. See Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
246. In 2001, Motley was able to obtain a computer hard drive from Afghanistan
belonging to Muhammad Atef, al-Qaeda's military commander. The hard drive contained
documents directing top Taliban officials to turn over large donations from Saudi charities
to terrorist cells in central Asia. Plaintiffs have also been able to obtain hard drives from
the Bosnian offices of the Al Haramain Charitable Foundation. See id.; see also Senior,
supra note 100, at 36-38.
247. Senior, supranote 100, at 36.
248. See id.
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Back in the United States, however, the plaintiffs in the
September l1th Cases have found that their largest adversary in the

discovery process is not the foreign defendants, but the U.S.
Department of Justice.24 9 Citing "grave national security concerns" as

their motivation, the Department of Justice has "interven[ed] to
control access to all evidence and documents related to private0
litigation ... regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.25
Though seemingly intrusive, the Department of Justice's meddling in

the civil discovery process is statutorily permissible under the ATA,
which permits the Attorney General to stay discovery or object to the
request of certain files if it is deemed that such discovery will impede

government criminal prosecutions or raise national security
concerns. 21' A Department of Justice letter to the district court
reveals

that

"officials

at

TSA

[Transportation

Security

Administration] have also been contacting witnesses [that have]
already [been] subpoenaed by attorneys for the plaintiff families,
telling them that they should send all Plaintiff-subpoenaed evidence

and documents to the TSA for initial inspection., 25 2 Indeed, the
government's actions thus far have led some to speculate on the
constitutional issues that arise when a district court permits
bureaucratic appointees to tamper with witnesses and evidence in
private civil proceedings.253 Others have been even more adamant,
contending that this "unprecedented vetting of evidence ...denies
the claimants their right to due process. "254
249. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
250. Tom Flocco, Justice Department To Attempt Shutdown of 9/11 Evidence Friday,
THE FEDERAL OBSERVER, July 13, 2002, http://www.federalobserver.com/archive.php?
aid=3200. Specifically, the Department of Justice sought the
entry of a global discovery order ...requiring that 1) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) be served with [have prior access to] all requests for party
and non-party discovery; 2) defendants and non-parties submit all proposed
discovery responses that may contain sensitive security information ... to the TSA
prior to releasing such material to plaintiffs; and 3) TSA have the necessary
opportunity to review such material and to withhold sensitive security information.
Id.
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 2336(b) (2000) ("If a party ... seeks to discover the investigative
files of the Department of Justice, the ...Attorney General may object on the ground that
compliance will interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution of the incident, or a
national security operation related to the incident, which is the subject of the civil
litigation.").
252. Flocco, supra note 250.
253. See id.
254. Walter Gilberti, Bush Administration Moves To Stifle Discovery in 9/11 Lawsuits,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Aug. 2, 2002, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/aug2002/
bush-a02.shtml.
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Unfortunately, it remains too early in the process to gauge the
court's response to these intrusions into the evidence-gathering
process. It also remains to be seen what role the district court will
play in this highly contentious discovery process as well as what
information the plaintiffs will manage to procure.25 It is clear,
however, that plaintiffs in terrorism lawsuits face unique barriers,
both at home and abroad, in gaining access to the information that is
needed to substantiate their claims. 6
F.

Executing Judgments Against Private TerroristDefendants

It is difficult to fully appreciate the legal and political aspects of
lawsuits aimed at private terrorists without addressing the
practicalities of executing judgments once a favorable verdict has
been rendered. 7 In most cases, foreign terrorist organizations have
few, if any, tangible assets that can be used to satisfy a judgment.25 8
Recognizing this grim reality, the plaintiffs in the September 11th
Cases have targeted organizations and corporations with substantial
financial holdings throughout the world. 259 Even in cases where
terrorist organizations and their supporters have considerable
holdings dispersed across the globe, attaching these assets to satisfy a
civil judgment can be extraordinarily difficult, 26 ° and plaintiffs are
often faced with the complex task of locating and collecting terrorist
assets abroad.2 6'
While nations are not generally obligated to recognize judgments
rendered by foreign courts, 62 international tribunals will often
enforce the judgments of U.S. courts "on the basis of reciprocity and
comity. ' ' 263 It is not entirely atypical for foreign courts, however, to
255. Interview with Ron Motley, supra note 20.
256. McGowan, supra note 220, at 196-97 (summarizing a number of the procedural
legal barriersthat have plagued many plaintiffs in pursuing terrorist defendants).
257. See Strauss, supranote 14, at 724.
258. Stratton, supra note 57, at 50. After all, the very concept of terrorism allows
small, unsophisticated organizations with limited means to carry out their violent missions
with only a fraction of the resources otherwise needed to mount conventional military
forces. See Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing,97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 315, 317-21 (2003).

259. See supra note 226 for information about the defendants in the September 11th
Cases.
260. See Warneck, supranote 117, at 220.
261. Strauss, supra note 14, at 726.
262. See id. at 724-25.
See generally RICHARD SCHAEFFER, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 96-97 (6th ed. 2005) (addressing the

enforceability of judgments rendered by foreign courts).
263. Strauss, supra note 14, at 725; see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895);
Ronan E. Degan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdictionover and Enforcement of
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"refuse to enforce judgments ... if they view the amount of money
awarded to be excessive ... or if they think the [U.S.] court extended

its net of jurisdiction too widely."2 " Furthermore, countries hostile to
the United States are unlikely to recognize any judgment rendered by
a U.S. court, regardless of fairness.265 Some believe that international
frustration with American foreign policy and the perceived arrogance

of U.S. courts abroad make foreign nations less likely than ever to

2 66
fulfill the dictates of America's civil justice system.

To bypass the labyrinth of executing American judgments in
foreign jurisdictions, plaintiffs in more recent cases, such as Boim and
Burnett, have focused their efforts on investigating and attaching

assets located within the United States or securing funds that have
already been frozen by the executive branch.267 As a general
proposition, collecting judgments against individual terrorists2 68 is

unlikely, as they
purview of U.S.
against terrorist
them, however,
27
bleak.""

typically have few assets within the jurisdictional
courts.269 With respect to executing judgments
organizations and the organizations that support
"the prospects for enforcement may not be as

In the case of Islamic charities that raise funds or own

Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 846-49 (1988) (noting that
the "[e]nforcement of foreign judgments commonly proceeds from notions of comity" and
respect for the sovereign power of the foreign state).
264. Strauss, supra note 14, at 725; see also Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal
Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American
Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 133-36 (1992) (opining that European nations are more
hesitant to establish jurisdiction predicated on continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum); Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 89, 114-16 (1999) (explaining that many foreign nations fail to recognize
American notions of jurisdiction such as general personal jurisdiction predicated on a
defendant's minimum contacts with the forum).
265. Walter W. Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of
InternationalTerrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 1, 41 (2002).
266. Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1029, 1051-52 (2005).
267. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th
Cir. 2002); Burnett I, 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (D.D.C. 2003).
268. Plaintiffs may also encounter difficulties establishing personal jurisdiction over
individual terrorist defendants without the systematic and continuous contacts necessary
for general personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v.
Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 260 (D.R.I. 2004) (refusing to enter default
judgments against individual terrorist defendants because of an insufficient showing of the
defendant's contacts with the forum).
269. See Heiser, supra note 265, at 38.
270. Id.
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property within the United States, these assets are routinely attached
to satisfy outstanding judgments.27 1
At first glance, executing judgments in the United States would
appear to be a relatively straightforward endeavor. After all, the
executive branch has tremendously broad discretion in seizing and
The
retaining the assets of foreign terrorist organizations. 272
273
("IEEPA")
Act
Powers
Economic
International Emergency
authorizes the President to regulate international financial
transactions in order to combat threats "to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States., 274 Although
presidents have traditionally utilized the IEEPA to impose economic
sanctions against foreign governments, more recently, these powers
have been employed "in the war on terrorism by using the law to
seize the assets of terrorist groups and thereby cut off their
funding. ' 275 Moreover, federal courts have uniformly accepted the
President's broad powers under the IEEPA to combat global
terrorism in a post-September 11th world.2 76 In Global Relief
Foundation v. O'Neill,27 for example, the Seventh Circuit upheld
President Bush's seizure of the appellant's assets, determining that
the IEEPA "is designed to give the President means to control assets
that could be used by enemy aliens," possibly to conduct acts of
international terrorism directed at the United States. 78
As part of the United States' response to the September 11th
attacks, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,224-"Blocking
Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit,
Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism. ' 1 7 Similar to prior
presidential decrees, 2 0 Executive Order 13,224 designated a number
of Islamic charities and Middle Eastern financial institutions as

271. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); § 1189(a)(2)(C); see Boim, 291 F.3d at
1005.
272. Strauss, supra note 14, at 728.
273. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000).
274. § 1701(a).
275. Strauss, supra note 14, at 728-29.
276. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (upholding the appellant's designation as a "Specially Designated Global
Terrorist" pursuant to an Executive Order issued under the IEEPA).
277. 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
278. Id. at 753.
279. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
280. In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,947, which designated
several organizations, including Hamas, as "Specially Designated Terrorists" and blocked
all of their assets within the United States. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079
(Jan. 23, 1995).
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"Specially Designated Global Terrorists" ("SDGTs") and froze all
their assets that were within the jurisdiction of the United States. 81
The Holy Land Foundation, a prominent Islamic charitable
organization, and the Al-Aqsa Islamic Bank, each of which are
defendants in the September lth Cases, have been designated as
SDGTs and their assets remain frozen.282 Currently, there are over
150 organizations designated as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order
13,224,83 many of which are defendants in civil terrorism lawsuits
stemming from the September 11th attacks. Nearly $27 million in
Taliban and al-Qaeda assets have been frozen in the United States
alone, and the U.S. Department of State reports that 139 other
nations currently have blocking orders in place.2 84
Despite the government's recent successes in freezing the assets
of terrorist organizations, however, there has been little success in
utilizing these frozen assets to satisfy civil judgments. Federal courts
have long recognized that plaintiffs are not necessarily entitled to
execute civil judgments against blocked assets that have been seized
by the United States government. 85 In Smith v. Federal Reserve
Board of New York,286 for example, the district court denied a request
by victims of the September 11th attacks to attach seized assets in
order to satisfy a civil judgment. 287 Although the plaintiffs were
entitled to compensation, the court determined that the President had
frozen the terrorist's assets, thereby vesting title in them with the U.S.
Department of the Treasury. 288 After assets become property of the
United States government, they cannot be attached in order to satisfy

281. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079-83 (allowing for additional SDGTs

to be named in the event that additional organizations are found to have aided, or are
associated with the terrorist groups currently subject to this order).
282. Strauss, supra note 14, at 729.
283. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079-83; MATrHEW LEAVITr,
WASH.

INST. FOR NEAR

EAST

POLICY, NAVIGATING

THE

U.S. GOVERNMENT'S

TERRORIST LISTS (2001), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05
.php?CID=1463.

284. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Shutting Down Terrorist Financial
Networks (Dec. 4, 2001), http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive IndexlShutting__DownTerroristFinancialNetworks.html.
285. See Strauss, supra note 14, at 737.
286. 280 F. Supp. 2d 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), afftd, 346 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2003).
287. Id. at 324; see also Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(adopting the prior decision of the Second Circuit in Smith v. Federal Reserve Board of
New York); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 274 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62 (D.D.C. 2003)
(determining that accounts that were property of the United States could not be attached
in order to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment against Iran), affd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7062
(D.C. Cir. April 22, 2005).
288. Smith, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
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a civil judgment absent a specific directive from the executive
branch. 9 And because the "President prefers to hold such assets as
bargaining chips in negotiating with rogue actors and states," a
presidential authorization to permit the use of terrorist assets to
satisfy civil judgments appears unlikely.21 In cases where litigants
have attempted to attach the frozen assets of foreign corporations and
organizations, the executive branch has repeatedly intervened to
prevent such action.29 1
Perhaps understandably, plaintiffs have continually complained
of " 'the utter absence of any coherent policy' " by the federal
government regarding lawsuits against private sponsors of
terrorism.292 The executive branch, on the other hand, continues to
maintain that "the enforcement of these multimillion-dollar
judgments undermine[s] its control over foreign policy and may
hamper its fight against terrorism. "293 Meanwhile, the blocked assets
of some foreign terrorist organizations have been steadily depleting.
The Treasury Department, for example, permitted the Holy Land
Foundation to use their frozen assets to pay attorneys fees and defend
themselves from the myriad of civil actions having been initiated in
the wake of September 11th.294
Despite these legal and political encumbrances, however, victims
of international terrorism have been undeterred in their quest to
bankrupt global terrorist operations. With more financial and legal
resources than ever before, victims have begun to target terrorist
defendants with substantial assets that can be utilized to satisfy civil
judgments.295 Whether the plaintiffs in the September 11th Cases will
289. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David L. Bosco, Fighting Terror with Civil
Litigation: The Wrong Approach, BULLETIN (The Atd. Council of the U.S., Wash., D.C.),

May 2002, at 2.
290. S. Foster, An American Inquiry into Contemporary Terrorist Accountability, 6
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 513, 531 (2002).
291. See S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the
Theory and Practiceof the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148

U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1295-99 (2000) (discussing the government's numerous attempts to
prevent litigants from attaching blocked assets); see also Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter,
Reagan, and Khomeini: PresidentialTransitions and InternationalLaw, 52 HASTINGS L.J.

303, 317 (2001) (recounting President Carter's efforts to prevent victims of the Iran
hostage crisis from executing their judgments).
292. Marcia Coyle, A Case of Terrorism: How Two Lawyers Brought a Suit They Just
Might Win, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 2002, at Al (quoting Allan Mendelsohn, Mendelsohn &

O'Keefe).
293. Strauss, supra note 14, at 726; see Adam Liptak, U.S. Courts' Role in Foreign
Feuds Comes Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at 1.

294. See Strauss, supra note 14, at 736.
295. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks 1, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 779-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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be more successful than their predecessors in executing judgments,
however, remains to be seen.
II. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: MAKING THE CASE FOR CIVIL
TERRORISM LITIGATION

The road to successfully pursuing a civil lawsuit against a private
terrorist entity is indeed hampered by a host of legal and practical
barriers. Although Congress has made terrorism lawsuits remarkably
easier-at least from a procedural vantage-over the past decade,29 6
executive branch officials continue to maintain that terrorism lawsuits
interfere with American foreign policy objectives and disrupt efforts
to stabilize relations with the Middle East. 297 The rise in civil
terrorism litigation that has occurred since the September 11th
attacks has succeeded in creating two dimensions in the War on
Terrorism-one that emanates from Pennsylvania Avenue and the
other which has found its way into federal courtrooms across the
United States. 298 This bifurcation of America's counter-terrorism
strategy has created an often times tenuous struggle between the
judicial interest in compensating victims of terrorism and the more
nebulous concepts of diplomacy and international relations in an
increasingly hostile world.
Since the beginning of our nation's history, scholars, politicians,
and statesmen have debated this very same issue-albeit in differing
contexts. 299 There has been consistent disagreement regarding the
scope of Executive power in the foreign policy arena and how this
power might conflict with the role of an independent judiciary
charged with protecting the individual rights of private citizens. 00
This debate is now largely concentrated around an extensive and
respected lineage of jurisprudence beginning with Chief Justice
Marshall's early analysis of Executive power31 and ending with more
296. See infra Part I.A.
297. See Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik, Politics and PersonalJurisdiction: Suing
State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675, 706 (1999) (discussing the potential adverse implications
that terrorism lawsuits may have on the broader foreign policy objectives of the executive
branch); Sealing, supra note 31, at 120-21, 143-44 (chiding the private justice being sought
by many plaintiffs in terrorism lawsuits).
298. Lehrer, supranote 75, at 359.
299. See Keller, supranote 266, at 1046-47.
300. See id.

301. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1804) (pronouncing on an
extraordinarily expansive vision of presidential authority in times of conflict by striking
down as unconstitutional presidential instructions that were contrary to the laws of
Congress).

20081

TAKING TERRORISM TO COURT

contemporary notions of presidential authority in a rapidly
transforming global environment.3" In perhaps the most resounding

affirmation of broad Executive power in the foreign policy arena, the
3 3 described the
Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright

"plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations." 3 °

Critics of terrorism lawsuits contend that these "legal actions
distort the structure of international law and the balance of power
among the branches of our federal government." 3 °5 Professor John

Yoo, a former official at the Department of Justice, argues that
American courts are not institutionally equipped to arbitrate private
acts of international terrorism in a civil context.3"6 Indeed, Yoo
contends that because U.S. courts see "only the discrete cases before
[them]," they "aren't good at measuring the costs and benefits of
anything ... they're good at right and wrong.""3 7 Many critics remain
wary of the diplomatic consequences of the September 11th Cases in
particular, where the range of terrorist defendants has multiplied

exponentially and now includes multinational corporations, oncerevered Islamic charities, and prominent members of the Saudi royal
family.30 8 Some argue that "[t]he juxtaposition of [the] increased

involvement of U.S. courts in foreign affairs with" America's
continued refusal to actively participate in multinational tribunals
"creates the image of a country happy to haul foreign defendants into

its own courts while stubbornly resisting even the remote possibility
that its own citizens might be called to account."3 9 Further inflaming
302. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the classifications of presidential authority, which are
now widely accepted and referred to as "zones of presidential authority"-a concept that
continues to be cited in support of broad exercises of presidential power); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936) (representing one of the most
expansive visions of presidential authority in the Supreme Court's history).
303. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
304. Id. at 320. Indeed, the executive branch continues to rely on the broad declaration
of authority pronounced in Curtiss-Wrightin order to justify its seemingly limitless powers
in fighting the War on Terrorism without judicial interference. See Raoul Berger, The
PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1972) (discussing
the "inherent Presidential power" recognized in Curtiss-Wright from an original intent
perspective); Keller, supra note 266, at 1046.
305. Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and
HistoricalContext, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 434 (2002).
306. See Liptak, supra note 293.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 23, at 115 (noting that successful terrorism lawsuits
"suggest that the world's sole superpower is arming itself with superpower courts," which
"may threaten those uncomfortable with U.S. hegemony").
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the situation, lead counsel in the September 11th Cases, Ron Motleya colorful attorney prone to rhetorical excesses3 10 and best known for
his infamous closing argument conducted while wearing a toy
stethoscope 31'-hardly typifies the most sensitive champion of private
action against foreign defendants.
What opponents of terrorism lawsuits fail to appreciate,
however, is that plaintiffs have been using America's civil justice
system as a means of calling for the atonement of international
atrocities for decades.312 Plaintiffs have pursued thousands of lawsuits
for causes of action ranging from human rights abuses in Latin
America31 3 to acts of international terrorism.314 In fact, courts in the
United States have pioneered the use of civil remedies to address
some of the most notorious savagery of the twentieth century, and the
success of these civil suits is indeed a remarkable chapter in American
Despite the existence of lawsuits aimed at
legal history.315
rights atrocities, there is no evidence that such
human
adjudicating
lawsuits "have weakened the structure of international law or
policy, much
threatened the coherence of our government's foreign
31 6
less the foundations of the U.S. constitutional system.
To the contrary, the grave threat of international terrorism may
simply be too important to relegate to the "unscrutinized domain" of
executive bureaucrats, and plaintiffs pursuing lawsuits against private
sponsors of terror are providing an exceptionally important tool in
the War on Terrorism. 317 Allan Gerson, a renowned expert in
international law, believes that terrorism lawsuits represent the
310. During press conferences, Ron Motley has referred to Prince Turki (a defendant
in Burnett) as the "Prince of Boloney," and "Prince Cooked Goose." See Senior, supra
note 100, at 42.
311. See id.

312. For example, during the 1980s, foreign plaintiffs looked to American courtrooms
to seek restitution for human rights atrocities that occurred at the hands of rogue
dictators. See, e.g., Estate of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala., 630 F.2d 876, 877-79 (2d Cir. 1980)
(commencing a wrongful death action after a political dissident was tortured and killed by
Paraguayan

officials).

See generally BETH

STEPHENS

&

MICHAEL

RATNER,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996) (providing a

detailed guide to the process of human rights litigation under the ATCA and the TVPA
and addressing issues such as international law, federal court jurisdiction, and statutory
construction).
313. E.g., Filartiga,630 F.2d at 879.
314. E.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th
Cir. 2002).
315. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 312, at 755-57 (summarizing the effective
use of American courts to combat human rights abroad).
316. Stephens, supra note 305, at 434.
317. Id. at 435.

2008]

TAKING TERRORISM TO COURT

" 'ascent of humanitarian law [first] articulated at Nuremberg in a
criminal context... and brought to bear in current exigencies through
the rise of a new jurisprudence.' "318 And despite the potentially
adverse consequences of terrorism lawsuits, this type of litigation
represents the way of the new world. The September 11th Cases
epitomize a new "wartime jurisprudence" that combats terror
networks by utilizing every available resource in bringing terrorists to
justice and maintaining America's long standing commitment to the
rule of law.319 In today's borderless society, those that dismiss
terrorism lawsuits as "worldwide ambulance chasing" may be
surprised to discover that American lawyers, more effectively than
ever before, can employ existing statutory schemes and procedures to
hold terrorist aggressors responsible, even in the most distant corners
of the world.32 °
While plaintiffs in terrorism lawsuits may be prone to meddling
in the delicate arena of foreign affairs, the "right to compensation
from those who financed terrorism.., is inscribed in the law and that
must be accommodated."32 ' In one of the earliest terrorism lawsuits,
a federal court in Washington, D.C., observed:
Today's holding is not a foreign policy edict; rather it is an edict
on the rule of law. It is an edict that reaffirms the unflinching
principle that those who intentionally harm United States
nationals will be held accountable for that harm in United
States courts.322
Furthermore, the enactment of terrorism-related statutes such as
the ATA seem to indicate the unequivocal intent of Congress that
victims of terrorism be allowed to seek financial redress in U.S.
courts.323 While judgments rendered in American courts may often be
unenforceable, victims may nevertheless gain some closure by
establishing liability-a crucial part of the healing process.324
Recently, however, many executive officials seem to have placed
their own self-elevated mission of diplomacy ahead of the rights and
318. Jamie

Glazov, Suing the Saudis, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE, Oct. 25, 2002,

http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=C40094BO-1AFB-4FD5-9COEFECD80656B65.
319. Senior, supranote 100, at 39 (stating that preventing America's civil justice system
from adjudicating acts of international terror " 'is like King Canute telling the tide not to
come in' "(quoting Harold Koh, Dean, Yale University School of Law)).
320. See generally id.
321. Glazov, supra note 318.
322. Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2001).
323. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
324. Stratton, supra note 57, at 53.
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liberties of individual Americans. In a world forever altered by the
specter of terrorism, "citizens should be able to press legitimate
grievances rather than be shunted aside for some theoretical state
interest."3 25 Even some government officials at the Department of
Justice have expressed grave concern that certain foreign
governments-namely, Saudi Arabia-have failed to impose more
stringent financial supervision over donations to Islamic charities and
have refused to share information in their possession regarding the
funding of al Qaeda.326 By creating "private attorneys general," civil
terrorism litigation empowers ordinary citizens to track down private
terror networks and seek out sources of terrorist financing.327 Indeed,
government initiatives are likely to be facilitated by plaintiffs willing
to dedicate vast resources to pinpoint the source of terrorist
financing.328 Unfortunately, it appears that there are currently few, if
any, cooperative investigative efforts between victim-plaintiffs and
the Department of Justice.329 Ideally, the government should be able
to harness private resources to aid its criminal investigations and, in
return, lend its own powerful tools to facilitate lawsuits against
private terrorist entities.
Although many Justice Department officials envision civil
lawsuits as a secondary alternative to criminal prosecution,3 30 the
prospect of holding terrorists criminally responsible for their actions
is minuscule.33 Moreover, the mere threat of criminal prosecution is
unlikely to provide any meaningful deterrent to future terrorists.332
Thus, civil litigation will likely bring about greater accountability for
defendants that finance and harbor terrorist entities.3 33 Increasing the
likelihood that terrorists will be held responsible for their economic
damages will provide an additional disincentive to carrying out acts of
international terrorism.334 Further, attaching terrorist assets in the
United States in order to collect a civil judgment may be more

325. Glazov, supra note 318.
326. Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch:

A Legal Counterattack,

NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Apr. 16, 2003, http://www.newsweek.com/id/58274.
327. Stratton, supra note 57, at 54.
328. See id.
329. See Telephone Interview with John Moore, supra note 50.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See Stratton, supra note 57, at 54 (noting that it may be easier to establish civil-as
opposed to criminal-liability for supporters of terrorists, thus "tightenfing] the
stranglehold on terrorism").
334. See id.

2008]

TAKING TERRORISM TO COURT

feasible than actually apprehending the perpetrators for criminal
prosecution.33 5
Both the risks and the rewards of civil terrorism litigation are
apparent. In the past, the executive branch has relied on the premise
that the President should be empowered to broadly dictate the
foreign policy objectives of the United States 336-not individual
litigants or their financially driven attorneys.
However,
"Congressional acquiescence in this area is clearly waning," 337 and it
appears that Congress "will no longer tolerate subordinating victims'
'33 8
interests to the foreign policy whims of the executive branch.
With Congress by their side, victims of terrorism should be permitted
to seek justice in any venue where it can be dispensed, despite any
political or diplomatic ramifications.
JOHN

335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
See Lehrer, supra note 75, at 359.
Id.
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